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Abstract
We build and estimate a non-stationary structural job search model that incorporates the main
stylized features of a typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and
acknowledges that search effort and requirements are measured imperfectly. Based on Belgian data,
monitoring is found to affect search behavior only weakly, because (i) assessments were scheduled
late and infrequently; (ii) the monitoring technology was not sufficiently precise, (iii) lenient Belgian
UI results in caseloads that are less responsive to incentives than elsewhere. Simulations show how
changing the aforementioned design features can enhance effectiveness and that precise monitoring
is key in this.
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1 Introduction
By now, the way limiting the coverage of UI and the duration of benefit entitlement can restore
work incentives has been well studied. At the same time, apart from limiting entitlement and coverage,
most UI schemes also provide incentives by imposing job search requirements on benefit claimants,
monitoring the resulting search activity, and issuing sanctions in case of non-compliance. Recently,
there has been growing interest among researchers in the evaluation of such job search monitoring (see
below). However, the behavioral channels through which these policies work remain largely unknown,
in particular when the unemployed are informed about the timing of the monitoring interviews and
sanctions. By integrating a monitoring scheme and the announced timing of associated interviews and
sanctions within a structural job search model, we shed light on the dynamic behavioral adjustments
induced by such a scheme.
In many OECD countries, monitoring of job search effort is organized along fairly standardized lines
(OECD, 2007). It starts off with a notification (often at initial registration) informing the unemployed
worker of the search requirements and the proofs thereof which are to be provided. Simultaneously,
the worker is informed of the timing of the evaluations of search effort and of the associated sanctions
in case of noncompliance. At the prescribed dates, past job search effort is evaluated on the basis
of transmitted paper proofs of job applications or in face-to-face interviews. If the outcome of the
evaluation is negative, a sanction in the form of a temporary and partial reduction of UI benefits
usually follows. In addition, another monitoring interview is planned shortly thereafter. In the case of
a second negative evaluation, the penalty is reinforced and can even lead to a permanent withdrawal
of benefits. If the outcome of the evaluation is positive, no sanction is imposed and a subsequent
monitoring interview is scheduled, but usually not so quickly as in the case of a negative evaluation.
In this paper, we develop and estimate a non-stationary structural job search model which inte-
grates the aforementioned key ingredients of a typical job search monitoring scheme1, as well as an
imperfect monitoring technology that acknowledges that job search effort and requirements are not
perfectly measurable. Taking this imperfection into account is crucial, because ignoring it would result
in too favorable an evaluation of the monitoring scheme (Cockx et al., 2014). By integrating the key
ingredients of a typical scheme, our model can also be used to study the impact of alternative designs
implemented in other countries, rather than only that of the design selected for the estimation.
In this research, we tailor our model to capture the main features of the scheme that was introduced
in the Belgian UI in 2004. As the scheme was gradually implemented by age, starting with the
youth, the estimation of our model is restricted to the population of 25- to 30-years-olds. From an
international perspective, the Belgian UI is very lenient and the monitoring scheme introduced in 2004
is no exception. The scheme was targeted at the long-term unemployed only, and characterized by
a low monitoring frequency and precision. Consequently, we find that the scheme hardly enhanced
the job finding rate. Based on simulations, we find that designing a “stricter” scheme, more in line
with those existing in other countries, reinforces the effect of monitoring on unemployment duration
by nearly a factor three. We also show that enhancing monitoring precision further boosts the impact
on the job finding rate. Nevertheless, these factors alone are not sufficient to explain the discrepancy
with the stronger effects found by other researchers, based on structural models for the U.S. and
the Netherlands (Paserman, 2008; van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2015). We conjecture that the
remaining differences can be explained by the particular composition of Belgian UI caseloads and
by the restriction to the youth, for whom active labor market policies are typically found to be less
effective than for the prime aged (Card et al., 2015, e.g.).
Various papers have estimated non-stationary job search models under the assumption of exogenous
search effort.2 Some papers have estimated job search models with endogenous job search intensity,
1Since the timing is announced, it is crucial to embed this in a non-stationary model, since the unemployed will
anticipate this timing and adjust their behavior as they approach the time when their job search is evaluated.
2See in particular Wolpin (1987), van den Berg (1990), Garcia-Perez (2006), Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006), and
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though assuming a stationary environment.3 DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2008)
are, to our knowledge, the first to have allowed for endogenous search in a non-stationary setting,
where non-stationarity stems from the finite entitlement to UI.4 The model of Paserman (2008) does
not consider monitoring of job search effort, but simulations based on this model investigate the
implications of a simplified monitoring scheme in which benefits are withdrawn if search effort falls
below a particular threshold. We add to this literature by combining non-stationarity, endogeneity
of search effort, and sanctions in a unified empirical framework which explicitly takes unobserved
heterogeneity into account.
To our knowledge, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2015) are the only ones to have developed
and estimated a stationary structural job search model which integrates job search monitoring. Their
approach of modeling monitoring imperfection is different from ours. We assume that the evaluation
of search effort is a random process in which the probability of a negative evaluation is a decreasing
function of average past job search effort (Boone et al., 2007). Following van den Berg and van
der Klaauw (2006), they assume that the unemployed search through two imperfectly substitutable
channels: a formal one and an informal one. Search effort is perfectly observed and monitored in
the formal channel, while it cannot be verified at all and is not monitored in the informal channel.
They consider an intensive monitoring policy targeted at short-term, relatively skilled unemployed
individuals in the Netherlands. Their model reveals that job search channel substitution reduces the
effectiveness of monitoring, but at the same time, together with on-the-job search, it also mitigates
the adverse effect of monitoring on job quality, as measured by accepted wages and job duration.
Other researchers have developed partial and equilibrium job search models that comprise job
search monitoring, but they do not estimate these models structurally. Moreover, either they assume
that the monitoring technology is perfect or that other behaviors than search are controlled.5 An
imperfect monitoring technology in which the probability of a negative evaluation depends on search
effort would, however, square better with existing schemes OECD (2007, p.218). To our knowledge,
only two studies have considered such imperfect monitoring technology. Setty (2015) builds a dynamic
principal-agent model with two levels of search effort to address a question of optimal UI with a
probabilistic monitoring technology in which the probability of a negative evaluation decreases with
the effort level. Boone et al. (2007) consider a stationary equilibrium search model with sanctions.
They assume, as we do, that effort is imperfectly observable to the planner, but, unlike us, that the
unemployed are perfectly informed about the search requirements (see their Appendix C). Here, we
do not develop an equilibrium job search model. The assumption that the wage offer distribution and
the supply of vacancies are unaffected is reasonable for the Belgian monitoring scheme, since it only
targets the long-term unemployed who represent a small fraction of potential recruits. However, when
considering policy reforms in which monitoring would target the short-term unemployed, our partial
equilibrium framework should be treated as an approximation.
There exists a more abundant empirical literature evaluating the effectiveness of monitoring schemes
within reduced-form models. Early studies6 found that a combination of monitoring and counseling
had a positive effect on the job finding rate. A number of later contributions have successfully isolated
the pure effects of monitoring. The evidence about its impact on transitions to employment remains
Lollivier and Rioux (2010).
3Bloemen (2005), Fouge`re et al. (2009) and van der Klaauw and van Vuuren (2010) among others.
4Launov and Wa¨lde (2013) formulate and estimate a non-stationary matching model with endogenous effort and time-
dependent benefits, but focus rather on equilibrium effects of UI benefit reduction in a Mortensen-Pissarides setting.
5Some authors assume that job search effort can be perfectly monitored (Pavoni and Violante, 2007; Manning, 2009;
Petrongolo, 2009; Wunsch, 2013); for others, the probability of a negative evaluation is independent of search effort
(Abbring et al., 2005), or it depends on the acceptance of suitable job offers (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995; Boone et al.,
2009), or on voluntary quits (Berg et al., 2015).
6See Meyer (1995) for a review of U.S. studies, and Gorter and Kalb (1996) and Dolton and O’Neill (1996, 2002) for
a review of European studies.
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rather mixed.7 Increases in withdrawals from the labor force or decreases in employment stability and
post-unemployment earnings are emphasized by Manning (2009), Petrongolo (2009) and Arni et al.
(2013) among others.
Using the same data as in this paper, in an application of a regression discontinuity design at
the age threshold of 30, Cockx and Dejemeppe (2012) found that job search monitoring did increase
the transition rate to employment by nearly nine percentage points before the first evaluation of job
search effort. Given that at this first evaluation the unemployed do not risk a benefit sanction (only in
the case of recidivism), this high treatment effect is puzzling. One explanation is that, despite being
robust, the treatment effect was imprecisely estimated. By imposing the restrictions implied by our
structural model, we indeed obtain a much smaller treatment effect.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the institutional setting.
Section 3 describes the sample selection and the data. In Section 4, we present the job search model
incorporating the main features of the Belgian monitoring scheme which we estimate subsequently.
Section 5 elaborates on the econometric model and discusses identification. Section 6 reports the
estimation results. In Section 7, on the basis of simulations, we evaluate the impact of the existing
scheme, as well as investigate whether and in which direction the design of the scheme in place (in
terms of timing of assessments, strength of sanctions and precision of the monitoring technology) could
be improved. Section 8 summarizes our key results and sets avenues for future research. The Online
Appendix contains further technical details regarding the theoretical and econometric model and its
solution.8
2 The Belgian Job Search Monitoring Scheme
In Belgium, UI, monitoring and sanctions are organized at the federal level. The Public Em-
ployment Services (PES) are under regional authority. They are in charge of counseling, job search
assistance, intermediation services and training. A worker in Belgium is entitled to UI in two instances:
(i) after graduation from school conditional on a waiting period of 9 months; (ii) after being laid off
from a job which was held for a qualifying period of time. In contrast to many other countries, there
is in principle no time limit to UI. However, sanctions may imply losing one’s entitlement to UI, in
particular in the context of the policy evaluated in this paper (see below). School-leavers are entitled
to flat rate benefits, while laid-off workers earn a gross replacement rate ranging between 40% and
60% of past earnings, which is bracketed by a floor and a cap. The benefit level depends on household
type (head of household, cohabitant or single)9 and on unemployment duration for those who are
single and for cohabitants. These principles are valid for the period covered by our empirical analysis
(July 2004 - December 2006).
In July 2004, the UI agency began monitoring job search effort. Since then, the agency has been
able to withdraw benefits in case of insufficient search effort. During the period we cover, there were
no other labor market reforms affecting the target group. The analysis is restricted to the Flemish
region, where the scheme was implemented without the provision of more counseling. Between July
2004 and June 2005, only unemployed workers younger than 30 were concerned. Afterwards, the
monitoring scheme was gradually extended to older age groups.
The monitoring process consists of a notification and a sequence of face-to-face interviews. Figure
1 summarizes the timing of the notification, the first interview and the subsequent interviews in case
7Positive effects were found by Klepinger et al. (1997), Lalive et al. (2005), McVicar (2008) and Bolhaar et al. (2016)
among others. No effect or negative effects were found by Ashenfelter et al. (2005), Klepinger et al. (2002) and van den
Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) among others.
8This appendix can be downloaded together with the data, the code and the instructions for using the code from
https://www.sites.google.com/site/andreylaunov/research/CDLV.zip.
9An unemployed individual is regarded as the head of household if she lives together with a partner or relatives
(children or other) whose labor earnings or allowances do not exceed a threshold set by regulations; otherwise, she is a
cohabitant, or single, if living alone.
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Figure 1: Timing of the Monitoring Process in Case of a Negative Evaluation
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of a negative evaluation. If the outcome of the evaluation is positive at any of the interviews, a new
sequence of interviews will start one year later at the earliest.10
First, at ts = t0 − 2, the administration selects individuals who have been entitled to UI for more
than 12 but less than 13 months. In the second month after selection, i.e. at t0 = 14, a notification
letter is sent by mail. It states that entitlement to UI benefits requires actively searching for a job
and participating in any action proposed by the regional PES. Some examples of search methods are
provided and it is clearly stated that one should collect written proofs of the search actions undertaken.
The letter does not, however, specify what evidence of search is sufficient. It announces that one will
be invited to the UI office to evaluate the actions undertaken and that these evaluations will start 8
months after the notification has been dispatched (t1 = t0 + 8 = 22).
These monitoring interviews last approximately half an hour. If search effort at the first interview
is deemed insufficient, an action plan is drawn up, but the worker is not sanctioned yet. A first sanction
is only imposed in case of non-compliance with the action plan 4 months later (t2 = t1+4 = 26). This
sanction consists in a second, stricter, action plan and a temporary reduction of the benefits bh to the
means-tested social assistance benefits b` until the third interview four months later (t3 = t2+4 = 30).
In case of a negative assessment at this third interview, the benefits are permanently withdrawn. The
individual can regain entitlement only after having been uninterruptedly employed full-time for at
least one year.
An action plan is an administrative form containing a list of types of job search activities (renewing
contact with the regional PES, sending application letters, registering with a temporary work agency,
and the like) imposed by the caseworker, together with an indication of the number of times each
activity type should be chosen to comply with the search requirements at the next meeting. As this
is the prerogative of the regional PES, caseworkers are neither allowed to offer job vacancies, nor
may they propose participation in training programs. Furthermore, sanctioning the refusal of suitable
offers is the responsibility of another service within the federal UI agency. An action plan is therefore
an individually tailored guideline for the job seeker. However, these guidelines were not very strictly
followed and considerable discretion remained. Interviews with caseworkers in charge revealed that
trade-offs between activity types were possible. Moreover, depending on the caseworker, action plans
that were not completely satisfied did not automatically lead to sanctions, while, conversely, action
plans that were followed were not always exempted from negative evaluations. The content of action
plans is not available in our data. In order to capture the aforementioned fuzziness and discretion in the
assessments, we model the relationship between job search effort and the outcome of the evaluations
1016 months later for the first interview and 12 months later otherwise.
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as stochastic (see Subsection 4.1).
The low frequency of monitoring contrasts quite starkly with that in many other countries: half
of OECD countries require reports of job search (in most cases) every two weeks or at least monthly
(OECD, 2007). On the other hand, sanctions in case of non-compliance with the action plan seem
generally tougher in Belgium than in other OECD countries. For instance, in the Netherlands, a typical
punishment for insufficient job search is a 10% reduction of unemployment benefits for a period of 2
months (van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006). In the 2010-2012 period in Switzerland, Arni and
Schiprowski (2015) report that “the median amount of a sanction is the monetary equivalent of 7 days
of UI benefits” (p. 10). In Section 7, we will study the implications of these design features of the
monitoring scheme.
During the period covered by our empirical analysis, the probability of a negative evaluation in
the population of Flemish UI recipients increased with the order of the meetings: 33.5% at the first
meeting, 45.8% at the second one, and 57.8% at the third. This may reflect both more strictness
and the sorting process by which less intensive job seekers are more likely to be subjected to later
interviews.
Only in some districts were unemployed individuals assigned to the same caseworker in principle,
though even in these districts the assignment was often not followed through for practical reasons.
There is therefore little scope for learning about evaluation standards across interviews. Regardless,
we cannot identify caseworkers in our data.
3 Data
3.1 Sample
The data originate from several administrative sources available from 2001 to 2006. We have access
to monthly information on UI benefit claims, the timing and outcomes of the monitoring scheme,
employment (including self-employment) and earnings (for salaried workers). Information about the
job search actions reported at the evaluation meetings is not available. Since our model does not
explain the choice of working hours, we just retain full-time occupations.11
Our sample consists of individuals aged 25 to 30 who were unemployed for 12 to 13 months between
May and August 2004 and to whom a notification was sent between July and October 2004 if they
were still receiving UI benefits at the time. To avoid modeling non-stationary behavior induced by a
declining benefit level after notification, we discarded cohabitants with sufficient past work experience
to be at risk of such a decline from our sample (see Section 2). This results in a sample of 903
individuals.
Since the sampling occurs two months before notification, we can check whether claimants an-
ticipated the notification by leaving the unemployment register beforehand. Cockx and Dejemeppe
(2012) could not find any evidence of such anticipation (see their Section 6.1.2). This means that we
can safely assume that the moment of notification came as a surprise. This can be rationalized by the
complexity of the duration counter used in the monitoring scheme.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample selected in 2004. Time-varying variables are
evaluated at the sampling date. Monthly earnings are measured at the start of a salaried employ-
ment spell. All monetary variables are measured in 2004 euros. The table presents the individual
characteristics conditioned upon in the empirical analysis (gender, level of education, household type
11We assume that someone hired for two-thirds or more of a full-time position is classified as a “full-time worker”.
This represents nearly 80% of exits to employment. The actual post-tax remuneration of the part-time workers retained
has been scaled to a full-time job.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Individual Characteristics in the Sample Retained
Number of individuals 903
Gender
Women 45.2%
Schooling levela
Primary or lower secondary (low) 34.8%
Upper secondary (middle) 40.0%
Higher education (high) 25.2%
Type of entitlementa (monthly UI benefit level in 2004 ea)
Entitled by work experience 69.2%
Head of household ([865 -1005]) 22.1%
Single ([725 -835]) 32.7%
Cohabitant (385) 14.4%
Entitled by schooling 30.8%
Head of household (835) 1.8%
Single (595) 7.2%
Cohabitant (325 ) 21.8%
Unemployment benefitsa
Mean (2004 e) 646
Standard deviation (242)
25% 385
Median 725
75% 835
Observed net monthly earnings (1st spell)
Number of individuals 427
Mean (2004 e) 1,199
Standard deviation (279)
25% 1,066
Median 1,214
75% 1,358
aAt the sample selection date.
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Table 2: Assistance Benefit Levels b` in Case of a Negative Evaluation at the Second or Third Meeting
and Size of the Sanction (Monthly Level in 2004 e)
Lowest Highest
Type of entitlement† Range of bh b` sanction∗ sanction∗
Entitled by work experience
Head of household 865 -1005 802 63 203
Single 725 -835 601 124 234
Cohabitant 385 0 385 385
Entitled by schooling
Head of household 835 802 33 33
Single 595 595 0 0
Cohabitant 325 0 325 325
†At the sample selection date.
∗ I.e. benefit loss bh − b`.
determining the benefit level) and the type of entitlement (school-leaver or work experience). The
monthly benefit level bh varies between 325 e and 1,005 e, and is on average 646 e. Those who find
a job earn 1,200 e (net of taxes) on average.
Table 3: Sampled Population at Each Step of the Monitoring Process:
% in the population at risk
Number of individuals 903
Steps of the monitoring process
Notification letter 723
(80.1%)
First interview 162
(17.9%)
Positive evaluation 112
(69.1%)
Negative evaluation 50
(30.9%)
Second interview 18
(36.0%)
Positive evaluation 16
Negative evaluation 2
Third interview 1
(50.0%)
Positive evaluation 1
Negative evaluation 0
Table 2 describes benefit levels, b`, in case of a sanction. These are means-tested social assistance
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benefits. Recall that no sanction is imposed after the first negative evaluation. After subsequent
negative evaluations, the same benefit amount is withdrawn, but the sanction is temporary after the
second evaluation, while it is permanent after the third. The benefit loss bh − b` ranges between 0
and 385 e/month. Table 2 reports the minimum and maximum sanctions by category. School-leavers
living alone (i.e. singles) are effectively not subject to a benefit sanction, since they remain entitled
to equivalent social assistance benefits. This concerns about 7% of the sample.
Table 3 displays the number of sampled benefit claimants at the various steps of the process and
the outcomes of each evaluation. Since these individuals may have found a job between being selected
and being notified, only 723 out of the 903 were notified. Among those notified, 162 attended the first
interview, of which about one third were evaluated negatively. Since the evaluation process is long,
delays in the scheduled timing are important, and many job seekers left the unemployment registers
before the interviews took place. Consequently, only very few sampled individuals were observed to
be evaluated for a second and third time. Subsection 5.2 will explain how we deal with these low
frequencies.
4 Job Search in the Presence of Monitoring
In this section, we formalize the job search behavior of infinitely-lived unemployed workers whose
job search is monitored similarly to the Belgian scheme. As shown in Figure 1, the unemployment
spell, and hence, the job search behavior, can be divided into five sub-periods: [0, t0), [t0, t1), [t1, t2),
[t2, t3) and [t3,∞).12 Since the unemployed in the retained sample are unaware until notifcation (at
t0) that they will be monitored subsequently, the scheme does not affect job search within the first
sub-period [0, t0). Since before the reform the unemployed were entitled to a constant unemployment
benefit bh without any time limit, their behavior within this first sub-period can be described by a
standard stationary job search model and is not explicitly formulated here.13 However, once the new
scheme has been implemented and everyone knows about it, monitoring is anticipated from the start
of the unemployment spell. When we simulate policy reforms in Section 7, we will allow for this
anticipatory behavior.
In case of compliance, the next evaluation will not take place within a year. We therefore assume
that a standard stationary job search model in which the benefit level is set to bh without any time
limit can approximate the resulting behavior. Similarly, we ignore the fact that, after a third negative
evaluation, individuals may be entitled again to UI if they remain employed full-time for at least one
year. As such, the standard stationary job search model with the benefit set to b` can describe the
behavior after t3.
We focus our discussion on how we model behavior within the three remaining sub-periods [tk−1, tk),
i.e. from the notification to the first meeting (k = 1) and after a negative assessment of search effort
at the start of the two subsequent sub-periods (k = 2 or k = 3). At the beginning of each sub-period,
it is assumed that the unemployed are well informed about the remaining stages of the monitoring
scheme. Below, we look at a generic sub-period k. Hence, the endogenous (control) variables for such
a generic problem depend on k. However, to avoid notational clutter, we do not explicitly denote this
dependence.
A feature that complicates the analysis is that, in reality, evaluations do not take place at the
scheduled times t1, t2 and t3, but are delayed for various reasons. These delays are important and
cannot be ignored in the empirical analysis. However, since accounting for these delays complicates
the analysis substantially without affecting the main insights, we will first ignore them. Subsection
4.4 discusses how these delays are taken into account.
12Calendar time starts at entry in unemployment so that (calendar) time and unemployment duration are synonyms.
13For laid-off cohabitants and singles, the benefit level could be step-wise decreasing in this first period, but since the
abatement is not very large, we ignore it. In Subsection 6.3, we demonstrate that this approximation does not invalidate
our analysis.
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4.1 Monitoring Technology
Since job search requirements need not be satisfied at every moment of the evaluation period, a
caseworker bases her evaluation on the average job search effort S¯(tk, tk−1) exerted between tk−1 and
tk:
14
S¯(tk, tk−1) =
∫ tk
tk−1
s(τ)dτ
tk − tk−1 , (1)
where s(τ) denotes the instantaneous job search effort at time τ ∈ [tk−1, tk), and here and in all
subsequent equations, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Researchers have generally assumed that the precision of the monitoring technology is perfect in
that job seekers are evaluated negatively if job search effort falls short of some predetermined target
and positively if effort exceeds this threshold (Paserman, 2008; van den Berg and van der Klaauw,
2015, e.g.). At this threshold, the first derivative of the probability of a negative evaluation is infinite
and the probability of a negative evaluation drops discretely from one to zero as the threshold is
crossed. Other authors have instead stressed that it is very difficult for caseworkers to measure the
search intensity of the unemployed without error (see e.g. Boone et al., 2007). As explained in Section
2, in addition caseworkers have some discretion in determining whether search effort is sufficient.
These two features are captured through a probability of a negative evaluation at tk
15
pik
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
]
with pi′k
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
] ≤ 0. (2)
In other words, the unemployed cannot increase the probability of a negative evaluation by raising
their job search effort.
4.2 Workers’ Problem
Workers discount the future at rate ρ > 0 and consume their current income entirely. Assuming
risk-neutrality, non-labor income other than unemployment benefits does not affect behavior and can
thus be normalized to zero.16 Workers can either be employed full-time or unemployed. If employed,
workers earn a constant net wage w > 0. There are no job-to-job transitions, and jobs dissolve at an
exogenous constant Poisson rate δ > 0. According to the legislation, if a temporary job interrupts
unemployment, workers remain entitled to benefits and the counter τ ∈ [tk−1, tk) determining the
timing of the next evaluation remains fixed to its value before the interruption.
With these assumptions, the expected lifetime utility of a worker transiting to employment at τ
is:
Wk(w; τ) =
w + δUk(τ)
ρ+ δ
, (3)
where Uk(τ) denotes the expected lifetime utility at reentry in unemployment after a spell of temporary
employment that started at τ .
As long as the unemployed worker is not sanctioned, she is entitled to a flat benefit level bh. A
sanction is imposed only from the second negative assessment onwards. At this point, the benefit level
falls temporarily to b` < bh. A third negative evaluation lowers the benefit permanently. Formally, for
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote Ok = 1 if the outcome of the evaluation is negative and Ok = 0 if it is positive,
and at notification O0 ≡ 1. If t4 ≡ +∞ and b(τ) is the benefit level at time τ , then ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, τ ∈
14Alternatively, the caseworker might place higher weight on more recent job search effort. Introducing such weighting
into eq. (1) is easy, but will not qualitatively affect the results.
15For a derivation with explicit micro foundations, see Cockx et al. (2011).
16Risk-neutrality is a strong assumption. Yet, since we lack complete information on non-labor income, this is the best
that we can do.
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[tk−1, tk) : b(τ) = bk ≡ bh and ∀k ∈ {3, 4}, τ ∈ [tk−1, tk) : b(τ) = bk ≡ bh − Ok−1(bh − b`). Apart
from unemployment benefits, the unemployed enjoy a value of leisure (net of stigma costs) equal to ν.
Search effort s(τ) is costly. We denote the cost of search function by c [s (τ)] and assume it possesses
standard properties, namely c(0) = 0, c′ [s (τ)] > 0 and c′′ [s (τ)] > 0. In sum, the net instantaneous
utility of an unemployed worker at τ ∈ [tk−1, tk) is
yk(τ) ≡ bk + ν − c[s(τ)]. (4)
Since Wk(w; τ) is strictly increasing in w, the worker’s optimal strategy is equivalent to accepting any
offer that exceeds a reservation wage wr(τ). Therefore, if F (·) denotes the wage offer distribution and
F¯ (·) ≡ 1− F (·), the transition rate from unemployment to employment at time τ is
p(τ) ≡ p [s (τ) , wr (τ)] = λ s (τ) F¯ [wr (τ)] ≥ 0, (5)
where λ denotes the job arrival rate per unit of search effort. The survivor function at τ , conditional
on being unemployed at tk−1 ≤ τ , is
P (τ, tk−1) = exp
{
−
∫ τ
tk−1
p (x) dx
}
. (6)
The optimal behavior over the interval [tk−1, tk) is found by choosing the paths of control variables
{s(τ), wr(τ)}τ∈[tk−1,tk] that maximize the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at tk−1,
subject to the laws of motions of the two state variables: the survival probability P (τ, tk−1) and the
average search effort S¯(τ, tk−1). Agents are assumed to be perfectly forward looking. This means
that they anticipate within each stage of the monitoring regime that the expected lifetime utility
decreases in case of a negative evaluation at the end of each stage. This anticipation induces non-
stationary behavior similar to the one that prevails when approaching the exhaustion of entitlement
to UI benefits. The non-stationary problem can be solved by backward induction, starting with the
stationary problem in case of a positive evaluation at any meeting, or with a negative evaluation at
the third meeting. One proceeds further backwards, considering each time an earlier meeting, up to
the moment of notification.
Formally, the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker at tk−1, for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is:17
Uk(tk−1) =
∫ tk
tk−1
[
yk(τ) + p(τ)W¯k(τ)
]
P (τ, tk−1)e−ρ(τ−tk−1)dτ
+ Uk(tk)P (tk, tk−1)e−ρ(tk−tk−1), (7)
Uk(tk) = pik
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
]
Uk+1(tk) +
(
1− pik
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
])
U+. (8)
The right-hand side of (7) is the discounted sum of three terms: (i) the “sum” from tk−1 to tk
of the instantaneous utility in unemployment yk(τ) weighted by the probability P (τ, tk−1) of still
being unemployed at each moment τ ∈ [tk−1, tk); (ii) the “sum” from tk−1 to tk of the expected
utility of employment conditional on acceptance W¯k(τ) ≡ E[Wk(w; τ)|w > wr(τ)] weighted by the
density of unemployment duration at τ , p(τ)P (τ, tk−1); (iii) the expected lifetime utility right before
the monitoring interview, denoted Uk(tk), weighted by the probability P (tk, tk−1) of surviving in
unemployment up to tk. Right before the job search assessment, the unemployed individual expects a
positive evaluation with probability
(
1− pik
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
])
. In this case, she is no longer monitored and
is permanently entitled to the high benefit level bh. The corresponding stationary expected lifetime
utility level is denoted U+. The unemployed individual expects a negative evaluation with probability
pik
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
]
. In this case, she enters the next stage of the monitoring regime, with the associated
lifetime utility Uk+1(tk). The latter declines over the different stages k.
17In Online Appendix A, we show how Uk(tk−1) can be derived from the limit of its recursive definition in discrete
time.
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After the first negative evaluation (k = 1), the individual has not been sanctioned yet, i.e. y2 = yh,
but the expected lifetime utility drops relative to its value U1(t1) just before the first interview, because
she has missed the opportunity of being permanently entitled to the high benefit level bh, and because
she anticipates the risk of the temporary sanction (yh − y`) at the second interview, which may turn
into a permanent one at the third: U2(t1) < U1(t1). Right after the second negative evaluation (k = 2),
the lifetime utility drops further relative to its value just before this assessment for similar reasons and,
in particular, because of the enhanced likelihood of being permanently sanctioned: U3(t2) < U2(t2).
Finally, right after the third negative evaluation, the lifetime utility drops to its stationary lower bound,
i.e. the lifetime utility U− after a permanent withdrawal of the UI benefit, when the individual is
just entitled to the social assistance benefit b` < bh: U4(t3) ≡ U− < U3(t3). These discrete drops
in lifetime utility across the different stages of the monitoring regimes provide valuable variation in
the behavior of agents that will be exploited in the identification of the structural parameters of the
model (see Subsection 5.2). The derivation of the optimality conditions described in the next section
can be found in Online Appendix C.18
4.3 Optimality Conditions
The pair of optimal paths {wr(τ), s(τ)} obey two first-order conditions (FOC). The first one is:
Uk (τ) = Wk(wr(τ); τ) =
wr (τ) + δUk (τ)
ρ+ δ
⇔ wr (τ) = ρUk (τ) (9)
This states that the reservation wage is chosen such that the expected lifetime utility in unemployment
and in employment at the reservation wage should be equal at every instant of time τ . In the previous
subsection, we explained that expected lifetime utility falls discontinuously after each negative evalu-
ation and smoothly in anticipation of these drops. From the last expression in (9), it follows that the
evolution of the reservation wage is just a scaled-down version of the evolution of lifetime utility.
After some manipulations, we obtain a generalization of the condition reported by van den Berg
(1990, Eq. (3), p. 259):19
wr(τ) + c[s(τ)] = bk + ν + p(τ)
E [w − wr(τ)|w > wr(τ)]
ρ+ δ
+ U˙k(τ). (10)
The interpretation is as follows. The right-hand side represents the benefits of continuing search if
one is offered a job that pays the reservation wage. It consists of three components: (i) the continuing
flow of income bk together with the net value of leisure; (ii) the probability of finding a job times the
expected discounted lifetime wage gains relative to the reservation wage, given that no job paying below
the reservation wage is accepted; and (iii) the rate of appreciation of the asset value of unemployment.
At the optimum, these benefits should be equal to the costs of continuing search, as expressed on the
left-hand side of Equation (10). They correspond to the opportunity cost of not accepting the job
and the cost of search effort. The benefit reduction from bh to b` induced by the sanctions in case
of negative assessments in the second and third interviews and the depreciation of the asset value
of unemployment in anticipation of these sanctions decrease the benefits of search both within and
between the different stages of the monitoring scheme.
The second FOC is:
c′[s(τ)] =
λF¯ [wr(τ)]E [w − wr(τ)|w > wr(τ)]
ρ+ δ
+
pi′k
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
]
tk − tk−1
[
Uk+1(tk)− U+
]
P (tk, τ)e
−ρ(tk−τ) (11)
18In Online Appendix C, the problem is generalized along the lines indicated in Subsection 4.4.
19We use the facts that U˙k(τ) = ρUk(τ) − yj(k)(τ) − p(τ)
[
W¯k(τ)− Uk(τ)
]
and, by (3) and (9), that
p(τ)
[
W¯k (τ)− Uk (τ)
]
= p(τ)E[Wk(w; τ) − Uk (τ) |w > wr(τ)] = p(τ)E[w−wr(τ)|w>wr(τ)]ρ+δ . van den Berg (1990) assumes
an exogenous job arrival rate and no job destruction (δ = 0).
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This generalizes the familiar condition that the marginal cost of search should equal its marginal
return (Mortensen, 1986, p. 871). The monitoring of job search enhances the marginal return by
the second term on the right-hand side of (11). Increasing job search marginally at τ decreases the
probability of negative evaluation by −pi′k
[
S¯(tk, tk−1)
]
/(tk− tk−1). The division by (tk− tk−1) reflects
that the evaluation occurs on the basis of average rather than instantaneous search effort. Since this
return realizes only to the extent that the worker is unemployed at tk, we need to weigh the value
of avoiding a sanction, [U+ − Uk+1(tk)], by the survivor probability between τ and tk. In addition,
since the evaluation occurs in the future (tk ≥ τ), the return is discounted by e−ρ(tk−τ). Therefore, if
pi′k(.) < 0, whatever the value of wr(τ), the incentive to search harder increases between the successive
stages of the monitoring scheme since the loss [U+ − Uk+1(tk)] cannot decline with k. However, even
if pi′k(.) = 0, which later turns out to be our estimation result, the marginal return to search increases
over the successive stages. This is because then the marginal return to search effort increases as more
wage opportunities open up when wage aspirations are gradually set at a lower level,20 which follows
from the declining lifetime utility over the successive stages (cf. supra).
4.4 Extensions
In this subsection, we discuss an aspect which has been neglected until now: the role of a temporary
occupation on the behavior of caseworkers and the issue raised by delays in the scheduled timing of
the job search assessments. The description of the monitoring technology in subsection 4.1 applies
to workers who have been continuously unemployed. For them, only the evidence about job search
effort matters. The guidelines for assessment instruct caseworkers to take job acceptance as sufficient
evidence of compliance with the search requirements. In the empirical analysis, we demonstrate that
work experience significantly increases the probability of positive evaluation, but it does not guarantee
such an outcome, suggesting again caseworkers’ discretion in the assessment. In the model, we take
this feature into account, but for purposes of tractability, we simplify by assuming that, in case of an
interruption, the probability of a negative evaluation no longer depends on past job search effort. Let
superscript i denote whether a worker has interrupted unemployment (i = 1) or not (i = 0) between
two interviews. Then, piik
[
S¯i(tk, tk−1)
]
denotes the probability of a negative evaluation for i ∈ {0, 1},
and pi1k
[
S¯1(tk, tk−1)
]
= pi1k, where pi
1
k is a fixed number. Notice that by allowing this dependence
on i ∈ {0, 1}, the (optimal) behavior of individuals depends on i. Online Appendix B explains how
FOC (10) and (11) must be adapted. Intuitively, for an unemployed individual who has not yet been
temporarily employed during the current interval (tk−1, tk), accepting a temporary job creates an
“entitlement effect” if, once the person is unemployed again, caseworkers are more inclined to evaluate
her effort positively.
Evaluations do not to take place at the scheduled moments t1, t2 and t3, but are rather delayed
for various reasons. The average delay is 5.75 months. A delay implies that each period [tk−1, tk)
is split into two sub-periods: a “scheduled interval”21 followed by a “delay interval”. According to
the regulations, no evaluation can take place within a scheduled interval. During the delay interval,
the meeting is assumed to arrive at a rate q.22 In Online Appendix C, we derive the FOC of the
optimization problem on the corresponding intervals. It turns out that the FOC of the reservation
wage, (9) and (10), is not affected when we replace the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed
by the corresponding ones in the scheduled and delay periods. By contrast, the FOC of search effort
does change. To understand why, notice that at the end of the scheduled interval, Expression (8) is
replaced by the lifetime value of entering the delay interval. The incentives of the monitoring scheme
are intuitively weakened, because delays introduce some probability that the meeting will not take
20The derivative of the first term on the right-hand side of (11) with respect to the reservation wage is strictly negative.
21Lasting for k = 1 and k ∈ {2, 3}, respectively 8 and 4 months.
22Delays are assumed to be distributed exponentially with rate q, truncated at a maximum observed delay. Truncation
from above and rate q are identical for all meetings.
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place until the maximum delay. The interested reader can find the precise formula in Online Appendix
C.
5 The Econometric Model
In this section, we discuss the specification and identification of the econometric model. The
derivation of the likelihood contributions can be found in Online Appendix F. Online Appendix G
describes in detail how the model is solved and estimated.
5.1 Specification
The estimation of the structural model requires the specification of the unknown functions c(.),
F (.), piik(.) (for i = 0, 1 and k = 1, 2, 3) and choosing the way in which these functions and unknown
parameters of the model (ρ, ν, δ and q) depend on individual characteristics. We allow the cost of
search, the separation rate, the value of leisure, and the mean of the wage distribution to depend on
gender and three levels of education (low, medium and high, defined in Table 1), which we denote by
x1. Furthermore, the cost of search and the value of leisure are functions of the household type x2
(head of household, cohabitant or single), since this affects the preferences for work and is informative
of other income in the household. Following the traditional labor supply literature (e.g. Mroz, 1987),
we exclude the household type as determinant of the wage distribution and the job separation rate.
Let x ≡ (x1 x2). Finally, in view of the limited set of observable individual characteristics, the cost
of search is also allowed to depend on unobservables u, independently distributed of x. Because of
computational limitations, we exclude this dependence from the other functions and impose that u
follow a discrete distribution with two points of support: u ∈ {v1, v2}, where Q1 and Q2 = (1 − Q1)
respectively denote the probability that u = v1 and u = v2 at entry in unemployment.
More specifically, the value of leisure and the job separation rate are specified as ν(x) = x′ζν and
δ(x1) = exp{x1′ζδ}, respectively. The functional form for the cost of search effort is
c (s; x, u) = ex
′ζε+u [eεs − 1] , (12)
where ε > 0. Since x includes a constant term, by normalization v1 = 0 to represent the reference
category: a male, highly educated head of household with u = v1.
The heterogeneity u is unobserved by the econometrician, but not necessarily by the caseworker.
Therefore, the realization of u can affect not only search effort, but also the probability of a negative
evaluation. At the kth interview and for someone who has not left unemployment since notification,
i = 0 (respectively, someone who has returned to unemployment after a temporary job, i = 1), we
assume that this probability takes the following functional form:
pi0k,u
[
S¯0 (τ, tk−1; x, u)
]
= exp
{−(αk,u + βk S¯0 (τ, tk−1; x, u))} , αk,u, βk ≥ 0, u ∈ {v1, v2} (13)
pi1k = exp{−γk}, γk ≥ 0. (14)
This specification depends on the observed characteristics x only through the average search effort.
We also experimented with a specification in which direct dependence on x was allowed for. However,
since it did not have any implications on the dependence of this probability on average search effort,
we did not retain it in the final estimations to avoid further increasing the computational complexity.
In Subsection 6.1, we will justify why we maintain the dependence on unobserved characteristics u.
The net wage offer density f(w) is assumed to be log-normal: w ∼ LN (µ, σ) , with µ (x1) = ex1′ζµ .
Observed net wages wo are measured with a multiplicative error m: wo = w · m, and the density
function of the measurement error h(m) is a unit-mean log-normal: m ∼ LN (−ω2/2, ω). Following
Christensen and Kiefer (1994), it can be shown that the density function of observed accepted wages
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fo(w
o; τ) if unemployment is left at τ is given by
fo(w
o; τ) =
∫ wo/wir(τ)
0
f(wo/m)
F¯ [wir(τ)]
1
m
h(m)dm. (15)
5.2 Identification
Throughout this subsection, except for the parameters of unobserved heterogeneity, we discuss
the identification of the unknown parameters for a subpopulation of individuals with a given value of
the discrete observed characteristics x. The data contain monthly information on the transition rate
from unemployment to employment (p(τ)) and non-employment, the net accepted wage (wo), and the
hazard rate from employment back to unemployment (δ). Since transitions to non-employment are
not modeled, they are treated as right-censored observations. The identification of the reservation
wage (wr(τ)), the wage offer distribution (µ and σ) and the variance of the measurement error (ω
2)
is standard (Flinn and Heckman, 1982; Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007; Keane et al., 2011). By the
assumption that the wage offer distribution is log-normal, the complete distribution can be recovered
from the truncated distribution of accepted wages. Moreover, the parametric assumption on the
measurement error in observed wages is sufficient to identify the complete wage offer distribution (µ
and σ) and the variance of the measurement error (ω2). Given that the reservation wage and the wage
offer distribution are identified, the job arrival rate, i.e. the effective search effort s˜(τ) ≡ λs(τ), can
be recovered from the transition rate to employment: s˜(τ) = p(τ)/F¯ (wr(τ)).
A distinguishing feature of our study is that we follow individuals across different job search
monitoring regimes in which the expectations about future benefit levels differ. The variation in
expectations across monitoring regime stages (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) generates additional variation in the
job search and acceptance behavior, which helps identify more unknown parameters than when only
one regime is considered. Formally, if the behavior is stationary within each of these regimes, each
regime generates two independent FOC, allowing each time to identify two unknown parameters. In
principle, this could identify ten unknown parameters: two in the regimes prior to notification or after
a positive evaluation, two after notification, and six after the three negative evaluations. In Online
Appendix D, we show how we can thus identify the value of leisure ν(x), the scale parameter of the
cost of search function ζε and the ratio ε/λ. The separate identification of parameters ε and λ from the
ratio ε/λ would require information on job search effort, such as e.g. the number of job applications
sent out per time period. The absence of this information makes us normalize λ to unity. In principle,
we should also be able to identify the discount rate ρ by exploiting this variation across monitoring
regimes. However, since trial estimates converge to unreasonably high values, following van den Berg
and van der Klaauw (2015), we decided to fix the discount rate to 5% per year. This means that in
the end we exploit the across-regime variation to identify only one parameter in addition to the two
that are already determined by the FOC in a single regime. Our model is therefore overidentified.
Yet, in practice, the overdentifying restrictions in this study are weak, since we hardly observe any
individuals who reach the second and third meetings.
The structural model implies that job search effort should be increasing and the reservation wage
decreasing over the different stages of the monitoring scheme. As a result, the hazard rate to employ-
ment must be an increasing function of unemployment duration. However, the observed hazard rate
exhibits negative duration dependence (Subsection 6.2 below). This negative duration dependence is
assumed to be induced by the dynamic sorting over the unemployment spell, which causes the more
employable individuals to leave earlier than the less employable ones. By matching the observed tran-
sitions (conditional on the observables x) to those implied by the theoretical model, we can identify
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (see e.g. Paserman, 2008), i.e. Q1 and v2.
The data provide information on the timing of the notification (t0) and of the monitoring interviews
({tk}3k=1), as well as on the outcomes of these interviews ({Ok}3k=1). Since we observe few individuals
who are monitored for a second and third time, the identification strategy of αk,u, βk and γk depends
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on whether k = 1 or k ∈ {2, 3}. We first explain the identification procedure for k ∈ {2, 3} under
the assumption that the parameters at the first meeting are identified. Subsequently, we discuss the
identification of the latter parameters.
We adopt the following identifying assumption. The sample average of the expected sanction
probability at meeting 2 (respectively, 3) relative to that at the first meeting in the sample is equal
to the corresponding relative probability in the population:
∀k ∈ {2, 3} : p¯ik
p¯i1
=
piak
pia1
(16)
The right-hand side of this equality is the ratio of the aggregate fractions piak in the population reported
at the end of Section 2. On the left-hand side, the denominator can be estimated from the data, and
the numerator is a function of the unknown parameters of the sanction probabilities at meeting 2
(respectively, 3). We can thus infer the latter if we assume that all parameters at the kth meeting
(for k ∈ {2, 3}) are tied to the estimated parameters of the first meeting by the same factor of
proportionality κk: ∀k ∈ {2, 3}, u ∈ {v1, v2} : αˆk,u = κkαˆ1,u, βˆk = κkβˆ1, and γˆk = κkγˆ1. We choose κk
to satisfy the equality in (16). Online Appendix E provides more details.23
Consider now the identification of α1,u, β1 and γ1 determining the probability of a negative eval-
uation at the first meeting. As for γ1, this parameter is directly identified from the fraction of indi-
viduals evaluated negatively at the first interview among those whose unemployment spell had been
interrupted by temporary employment prior to the assessment. In Online Appendix D, we demon-
strate that, with the available data, we identify the ratio β1/λ. Consequently, by the aforementioned
normalization λ = 1, we identify β1.
As for α1,v1 and α1,v2 , the identification argument is as follows. The observed fraction of negatively
evaluated individuals in the sample is a weighted average of the probabilities of negative evaluations for
individuals of each unobserved type. Since the dynamic sorting implies that the fraction of unobserved
types evolves with unemployment duration according to each individual’s search effort and reservation
wage and because these fractions are identified, the weights are known and vary across individuals.
The individual variation in these weights then ensures that α1,v1 and α1,v2 can be separately identified.
In the specification of the likelihood function in (F-5) in Online Appendix F, we show how the observed
fraction of negatively evaluated individuals can be written as a weighted average.
Summing up, we can identify all the parameters of our model once we have normalized λ to unity.
Henceforth, given this normalization, the arrival rate of job offers is simply equal to the level of search
effort.
6 Results
6.1 Estimated Parameters
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates. During the maximization of the likelihood function, the
mass point v2 was systematically converging to very high values, meaning that the cost of search of
type v2 individuals tends to infinity and hence their effective search effort (i.e. their exit probability)
converges to zero. Therefore, the ultimate specification of the mixture removes v2 and places a
positive probability mass at infinite duration. The share of the unemployed who do not search for
a job is equal to 20.4% at entry (see the estimated value of Q2 in Table 4). This high share can be
explained by the leniency of the UI in Belgium where, before the reform, non-searchers could claim UI
indefinitely without their job search being monitored throughout the spell. The introduction of job
search monitoring in 2004 cannot have affected the composition of the UI benefit claimants retained in
the sample analyzed, since these individuals were informed by surprise only after 14 months that their
23See Ridder and van den Berg (2003) for another example in which the parameters of interest can be identified from
aggregate data if individual micro data are unavailable.
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters a
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
ζε constant 1.092 (1.225) ζδ constant −4.082 (0.174)
female −5.418 (3.175) female 0.475 (0.150)
skill-low −1.722 (0.882) skill-low 1.225 (0.203)
skill-med −1.568 (0.803) skill-med 0.791 (0.185)
single 4.268 (1.033)
cohabitant 4.401 (1.015)
ζν constant −0.795 (0.203) ζµ constant 7.040 (0.090)
female 0.615 (0.389) female −0.170 (0.055)
skill-low 1.931 (0.614) skill-low −0.036 (0.037)
skill-med 1.018 (0.599) skill-med −0.055 (0.032)
single 1.375 (0.498)
cohabitant 4.431 (0.535)
ln(ε) 1.735 (0.539) α1,v1 1.563 (1.286)
σ 0.175 (0.030) α1,∞ 0.852 (0.206)
ω 0.067 (0.008) β1 0.000 −c
q 0.159 (0.032) γ1 1.705 (0.320)
Q2 0.204 (0.018)
Log-likelihood −3969.86
Probability pi of negative evaluation 1st meeting 2nd meetingb 3rd meetingb
Non-job seekers 0.43 0.49 0.57
Job seekers 0.21 0.27 0.36
Job seekers after job interruption 0.18 0.24 0.32
a Symbols: ζε: Coefficient vector of covariates in the cost of search function;
ζν : Coefficient vector of covariates in the value of leisure, i.e. ν (x) measured
in hundreds of e;
ln(ε): ln of the multiplier of search in the cost of effort;
σ: Standard deviation of the log-wage offer distribution;
ω: Standard deviation of the log-measurement error distribution;
q: Arrival rate of the meeting in the delay period;
Q2: Share of people at entry with infinite cost of search, i.e. non-job seekers;
ζδ: Coefficient vectors of covariates in the separation rate;
ζµ: Coefficient vector of covariates in the mean of the wage distribution;
α1,v1 : Constant term in the probability of negative evaluation at the
1st meeting when the cost of search is finite and i = 0;
α1,∞: Same parameter but when the search cost tends to ∞;
β1: Coefficient of S¯(t1, t0) in the probability of negative evaluation at the 1st
meeting;
γ1: Constant term in the probability of negative evaluation at the 1st meet-
ing if i = 1.
b The probability of a negative evaluation at the 2nd and 3rd meetings is obtained by mul-
tiplying the parameters determining this probability at the 1st meeting by κ2 = 0.829
and κ3 = 0.653, respectively. The latter are solved such that the sample averages of the
individual probabilities at the second and third interviews are compatible with the aggre-
gate observed frequencies (see Subsection 5.2 and Online Appendix E).
c Since the estimate of β1 lies on the boundary of the parameter space, the standard error
is not computed.
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Figure 2: The Share of the Unemployed Searching for a Job
entry notification 1st meeting 2nd meeting 3rd meeting
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
job search effort would subsequently be monitored. However, even when the scheme is fully instituted
and UI benefit claimants are informed from the start of unemployment that their job search will be
monitored, there is no reason initially for these non-job seekers not to continue claiming UI rather
than the lower means-tested welfare benefits, since monitoring starts so late in the unemployment
spell. This is very different from the institutional environment in several other OECD countries,
where job search monitoring starts early in the unemployment spell and is much more intensive, so
that from the start non-job seekers do not claim UI. We return to this point in Subsection 7.4 where
we make an international comparison and explain that the effectiveness of the Belgian monitoring
scheme is not only much reduced by the drawn-out timing of the monitoring interviews, but also by
this compositional effect. Figure 2 illustrates that dynamic sorting leads to negligible shares of the
unemployed searching for a job upon reaching the second and third meetings. Consequently, as the
scheme that we evaluate to a large extent monitors individuals with extremely high search costs, the
behavioral impact and the implied budgetary savings that the scheme generates cannot be important.
In the specification, we allow the probability of a negative evaluation pi0k,u(.) to depend on the
unobserved characteristics u. We allow for this dependence, because the aforementioned estimation
result revealed that a non-negligible fraction of UI claimants are not searching for a job: we would
not have introduced this dependence if the point of support v2 of the unobserved heterogeneity had
converged to a finite value. Benefit claimants are aware that some caseworkers have the technology to
identify who is not searching for a job and that caseworkers are more likely to evaluate the behavior of
such individuals negatively. However, since this technology is imperfect and since caseworkers have the
discretion to consider these non-job seekers, typically people with health or psychological problems,
or singles caring for young children, as “deserving”, not all of them will receive a negative assessment.
The probability of a negative evaluation is estimated to be 0.43 at the first meeting, 0.49 at the second
one and 0.57 at the third.
Benefit recipients who do search for a job are about half as likely to be negatively evaluated at
the first meeting as non-seekers: 0.21. At the two subsequent evaluations, a sanction is imposed
respectively with probability 0.27 and 0.36. While raising job search effort at the extensive margin
pays, it does not pay at the intensive margin: βˆ1, and, hence, the corresponding parameters at later
meetings converge to zero. This finding is robust to the inclusion of the observed characteristics
x as control variables in the specification of pi0k,u(.) (not reported). The convergence of βˆ1 to the
boundary of the parameter space is not the consequence of non-identification due to lack of variation
in S¯0 (τ, tk−1; x, vˆ1). The coefficient of variation of this variable in the sample of individuals present at
the first meeting and used in the estimation of βˆ1 is 0.67. Thus, the issue is rather that this variation
is unrelated to the probability of a negative evaluation. Apparently, search effort is measured with too
much error and/or caseworkers have too much discretion to ensure that the probability of a negative
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evaluation decreases marginally with job search intensity. Consequently, the additional search incentive
identified by the second term on the right-hand side of the FOC for job search effort in Equation (11)
is zero and eventually does not play a role. In Section 7, we will nevertheless illustrate its impact
based on simulations. Interrupting unemployment to take a temporary job (i = 1) further reduces
the likelihood of a negative assessment to 0.18 at the first meeting, and to 0.24 and 0.33 at the two
subsequent interviews.
According to our estimates, the marginal costs of search are lowest for women and the low educated.
These findings are unexpected, since these two groups are usually found to be disadvantaged on
the labor market. A possible explanation is that employers recognize that these groups have more
difficulties on the labor market, so that being unemployed does not convey as negative a signal for
them as for more advantaged groups. The latter are expected to directly transit to employment when
they enter the labor market and to transit to other jobs through on-the-job search. Hence, employers
may be less likely to offer jobs24 to these advantaged groups when they are unemployed (Eriksson and
Gottfries, 2005; Eriksson and Lagerstro¨m, 2006; Longhi, 2015). By contrast, heads of households may
perceive lower marginal costs, because their family responsibility may push them to find a job more
quickly than cohabitants or singles.
In line with expectations, the value of leisure is higher for women, the low educated, cohabitants,
and to a lesser extent, for singles. The high estimated value of leisure for cohabitants (443 e/month)
suggests that household activities within this group are highly valued. By contrast, the reference indi-
vidual (highly educated male head of household) seems to perceive stigma costs to being unemployed
of about 80 e/month.
Disadvantaged workers on the labor market, such as women and the low educated, are more likely
to separate from jobs. Women enter lower paying jobs more often than men do, but the educational
level does not seem to play a significant role in the determination of entry wages. This finding is in
line with the aforementioned interpretation that the highly educated are less likely to be offered jobs,
because of the negative signal their unemployment conveys. Hence, if they are offered a job, it does not
pay more than for the low educated. Note that the standard deviation of the log wage distribution is
estimated to be about 6.7% of the mean offered log wages. It accounts for just 13% (= ωˆ2/
(
ωˆ2 + σˆ2
)
)
of the variance of the observed accepted log wages. This relatively small measurement error suggests
that the log-normal wage offer distribution fits the observed wages quite well.
Finally, q is estimated to be equal to 0.159. Since the delay is capped by the maximum observed
one (see Subsection 4.4), the average delay is 5.75 months, which is somewhat shorter than the
average of the corresponding untruncated exponential distribution, i.e. 1/0.159 = 6.3, but still remains
substantial. This points to an additional source of inefficiency in the scheme.
6.2 Internal Validation: Goodness of Fit
This subsection reports the within-sample fit of the model. First, in the left panel of Figure 3, the
solid line represents the hazard function of job finding since notification as predicted by the structural
model, and the dashed line, the smoothed non-parametric counterpart (see Tanner and Wong, 1983).
The optimal bandwidth for this non-parametric estimator is chosen by cross-validation, as suggested
by Tanner and Wong (1984). The 95% confidence interval around the smoothed non-parametric hazard
function (dotted lines) is based on the bootstrap with 1,000 replications. The right panel of Figure
3 displays the density function of observed net monthly earnings predicted by the structural model
(solid line) and the kernel density of observed wages from the data (dashed line). The Kernel function
is Epanechnikov and the optimal bandwidth is Silverman. The 95% confidence interval around the
kernel density estimate (dotted lines) is likewise based on the bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
The sorting induced by unobserved heterogeneity generates negative duration dependence in the
24Recall that our model cannot discriminate between the marginal effect of search on costs for the unemployed and
on the job arrival rate (see Subsection 5.2).
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Figure 3: Goodness of Fit of the Model
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The solid lines display the predictions of the hazard and the wage density based on the simulated structural model.
The middle dashed lines represent the smoothed non-parametric hazard to employment based on the notified
individuals in the sample (left panel) and the density of observed accepted wages (right panel). The dotted
lines around the dashed lines delineate the 95% confidence intervals around the aforementioned non-parametric
estimates.
hazard rate to employment. The fitted hazard of job finding and density of observed wages are
almost everywhere within the confidence bounds of the corresponding nonparametric estimates. This
underlines a very good fit of our structural model to the data.
6.3 External Validation
We propose an out-of-sample validation that is somewhat different from the standard approach
(see e.g. Todd and Wolpin, 2006). In the standard approach, researchers would typically use pre-
reform data to check whether the predictions of the model about the impact of the program track
the (non-)experimental post-reform impact estimates. However, we could not follow such a strategy,25
since it turns out that economic conditions were notably worse in the pre-program period than during
the time when the program was implemented. GDP real growth reached only 0.8% in 2003 against
2.7% on average between 2004 and 2006, which adversely affected pre-reform exit rates to employment.
This would therefore require that our structural model not only predict the impact of the program,
but also the impact of the improved economic conditions, which is clearly too ambitious.
We therefore propose a less ambitious validation exercise. We aim at checking whether, in the
absence of the policy reform, a stationary version of our structural model can reproduce the dynamic
sorting between entry in unemployment and the date of sample selection (i.e. 14 months later),
accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity as estimated. If the model reproduces the pre-
reform sorting correctly, we can safely perform counterfactual policy experiments with notification
set at any point in time. Of special interest will be the notification at the moment of entry to
unemployment, which corresponds to the monitoring scheme not coming as a surprise anymore (see
Section 7).
In order to implement this validation exercise, we have obtained from the UI agency an additional
25Notice that this strategy would in any case be partial, since the parameters of the probability of a negative evaluation
can only be identified on the basis of post-reform data.
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random sample of individuals born and starting their unemployment spell at the same time period
as those retained for the estimation. On this sample, we simulate our model until the counterfactual
sample selection date, i.e. at an elapsed unemployment duration of 14 months. We then check whether
the distribution of observed personal characteristics in this simulated external sample is statistically
indistinguishable from the corresponding distribution in the sample that was selected for estimation.
This is not obvious, since the unobserved heterogeneity induces sorting over time which changes the
composition of observables over the course of the unemployment spell at different speeds: among those
with observed characteristics that enhance employability, this sorting process operates more rapidly
than among those who are less employable (see e.g. Ridder, 1984).26
The simulation is repeated 1,000 times to account for the classification error of an individual
searching or not for a job, as well as to account for sampling error in both the inflow sample and
the sample retained for estimation. The first column of Table 5 reports sample fractions, rˆ, of the
mutually exclusive and exhaustive partition of individual characteristics in the sample that we use to
estimate our structural model. The second column of this table reports sample fractions, rˆsim, in the
very same partition of individual characteristics at the counterfactual date of selection simulated using
the aforementioned inflow sample into unemployment. The last two columns show the t-statistic and
the p-value of the test of H0 : r = rsim, variable by variable, respectively.
Table 5: Distribution of Personal Characteristics at the (Counterfactual) Selection
Variable rˆ (s.e.) rˆsim (s.e.) t-stat. p-Value
“female”×“skill-low”×“single” 0.021 (0.005) 0.020 (0.006) 0.116 0.908
“female”×“skill-low”×“cohabitant” 0.030 (0.006) 0.065 (0.011) −2.850 0.004
“female”×“skill-low”×“hh-head” 0.081 (0.009) 0.059 (0.010) 1.560 0.119
“female”×“skill-med”×“single” 0.062 (0.008) 0.063 (0.011) −0.085 0.933
“female”×“skill-med”×“cohabitant” 0.086 (0.010) 0.096 (0.013) −0.601 0.548
“female”×“skill-med”×“hh-head” 0.054 (0.008) 0.061 (0.010) −0.589 0.556
“female”×“skill-high”×“single” 0.046 (0.007) 0.059 (0.010) −1.034 0.302
“female”×“skill-high”×“cohabitant” 0.059 (0.008) 0.063 (0.011) −0.369 0.712
“female”×“skill-high”×“hh-head” 0.013 (0.004) 0.011 (0.004) 0.405 0.686
“male”×“skill-low”×“single” 0.112 (0.011) 0.119 (0.014) −0.400 0.690
“male”×“skill-low”×“cohabitant” 0.044 (0.007) 0.036 (0.008) 0.730 0.466
“male”×“skill-low”×“hh-head” 0.062 (0.008) 0.051 (0.010) 0.841 0.400
“male”×“skill-med”×“single” 0.105 (0.010) 0.095 (0.013) 0.637 0.524
“male”×“skill-med”×“cohabitant” 0.063 (0.008) 0.048 (0.009) 1.249 0.212
“male”×“skill-med”×“hh-head” 0.025 (0.005) 0.033 (0.008) −0.788 0.431
“male”×“skill-high”×“single” 0.055 (0.008) 0.045 (0.009) 0.910 0.363
“male”×“skill-high”×“cohabitant” 0.079 (0.009) 0.067 (0.011) 0.826 0.409
“male”×“skill-high”×“hh-head” 0.005 (0.002) 0.011 (0.005) −1.276 0.202
We see that, on the variable-by-variable basis, we do not reject the hypothesis that the rela-
tive sizes of all cells in the partition of individual characteristics, except for the “female”×“skill-
low”×“cohabitant” one, are equal at any standard level of significance. The test statistic of joint
equality of the actual distribution of covariates and the distribution of covariates generated by the
26Furthermore, if the neglect of declining benefits for laid-off cohabitants and singles at the beginning of the unem-
ployment spell (see footnote 13) mattered, then this should also lead to a rejection of the validation test.
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model, H0 : r = rsim, is given by
(rˆ− rˆsim) Σˆ− (rˆ− rˆsim)′ ∼ χ2rk[Σ]
where Σˆ− is the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of the estimated covariance matrix of the difference
between actual and model-based cell frequencies27 and rk[Σ] denotes its rank (see Andrews, 1988a,
1988b, for a general theory and applications). Since these 18 cell frequencies add up to one, we have
that rk[Σ] = 17 and the value of this test statistic is 18.95 with a p-value of 0.33. Hence, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the actual and model-based distributions of covariates at the moment of
selection are equal.
6.4 Implied Behavioral Responses
Since the parameter estimates are not informative about the behavioral responses to the monitoring
scheme over time in terms of search effort and reservation wage, we simulate the optimal behavior of
a job seeker with average observed characteristics. We assume that she does not leave unemployment
before the third meeting, she does not experience any temporary employment after notification (i = 0),
the outcome of the evaluations are always negative and there are no delays in the timing of the
meetings.
Figure 4 displays the time paths of the simulated behavioral responses. It comprises four panels.
The upper-left panel plots the evolution of effective search effort, i.e. the monthly arrival rate of job
offers. The upper-right panel traces the monthly net reservation wage (in euros) and the lower-left
one, the corresponding acceptance rate. Finally, the lower-right panel shows how the product of the
job arrival rate and the acceptance probability translates into the monthly transition rate towards
full-time employment. On the horizontal axis, duration, measured in months, is normalized to zero at
notification. The solid lines display the behavior predicted by the model evaluated at the parameter
estimates reported in Table 4, apart from q = 0 (no delays). The dashed lines will be discussed in
Subsection 7.5.
Before notification, nearly 0.70 job offers arrive on average per month and about 20% of these
jobs are accepted, so that the average monthly exit rate is about 14% (0.7 ∗ 0.2 = 0.14). Since the
environment is stationary before notification, this corresponds to an average unemployment duration
of about 7 months. After the third negative evaluation, the unemployed are permanently sanctioned
and entitled to the lower welfare benefits. This raises the job arrival rate to about 0.77 and the job
acceptance probability to about 27%, resulting in an exit rate to employment of about 21% and an
average residual unemployment duration of slightly less than 5 months. The search effort, acceptance
probability and job finding rate rise, as a consequence of anticipatory behavior, gradually between
meetings, and abruptly just after each negative assessment, from the levels before notification to
those after the third negative evaluation. The job finding rate is eventually raised by about 50%,
which is substantial. However, notice that the rate of increase in all three variables is very slight
between notification and the first interview. This is because the first negative evaluation does not
involve an immediate sanction, but only the threat of a temporary withdrawal of benefits at the
second assessment. The transition rate to employment is actually not substantially affected before the
second meeting. It surges most after the third negative evaluation when unemployment benefits are
permanently withdrawn. The spread-out timing of the monitoring interviews substantially reduces
the effectiveness of the scheme in raising the exit rate to employment of the notified unemployed.
This is further reinforced by the delays in the scheduled timing of the meetings, which are ignored
in Figure 4 for illustrative purposes. Beyond the second interview - the point from which the impact
of monitoring starts to matter - about 90% of notified individuals are actually not seeking a job (cf.
27By independence between these samples, the covariance matrix of the difference is equal to the sum of the estimated
covariance matrices.
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Figure 4: Predicted Optimal Behavioral Responses to the Monitoring Scheme at the Sample Average a
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aFor the parameter estimates reported in Table 4 and a job seeker with average characteristics, the solid lines
display the time profile of the behavioral responses to the monitoring scheme in the absence of delays (setting
q = 0), and conditional on remaining unemployed and being negatively evaluated at each meeting. The dashed
lines display these profiles for a monitoring technology that generates “front-loading”, i.e. for α1,v1 = αˆ1,∞ = 0.85
and β1 = 0.82 (See Subsection 7.5). Without delays the 1
st, 2nd and 3rd meetings take place respectively 8, 12
and 16 months after notification.
Figure 2) and, hence, are not influenced at all by the job search assessments. This means that the
monitoring scheme did not manage to raise the average job finding rate of notified individuals in any
significant way. In the next subsection, we investigate whether a change in the design of the scheme
could affect this conclusion.
7 Policy Evaluation
An acknowledged advantage of structural estimation is that it allows simulation and the subsequent
evaluation of alternative policy designs in a behaviorally consistent framework. In this section, we
evaluate the current monitoring policy, as well as its sensitivity to some alternative design features. In
doing so, we consider the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT). Throughout this section, the
treatment effect is defined relative to an environment without monitoring of search effort where a flat
benefit level bh is paid out indefinitely. We consider five indicators: (i) the expected unemployment
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duration, (ii) the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual, U0k (t0), (iii) the expected
lifetime labor earnings, which differs from the previous indicator in that it excludes unemployment and
assistance benefits, the value of leisure, and the cost of search, (iv) the expected expenditures of public
authorities on unemployment and assistance benefits, and on implementing job search assessments,28
(v) the “net social gain”, which measures the difference between U0k (t0) (indicator ii) and the expected
public expenditures (indicator iv). We must stress that this is not a measure of ‘social welfare” as
the data required that, like most researchers, we impose risk-neutrality.29 The last four indicators
are computed as the average net present values discounted from the start of the treatment.30 Their
formal definitions can be found in Section H of the Online Appendix.
We start by evaluating the existing 2004 policy design. First, we simulate the ATT of introducing
the monitoring scheme on the population of 25- to 30-year-olds with and elapsed unemployment
duration of 14 months (t0 = 14) notified by surprise that their search effort will be monitored for the
first time eight months later (t1 = 14+8 = 22). Once the monitoring scheme was fully operational, the
notification no longer comes as a surprise after 14 months. Thus, next, we repeat the evaluation for
the sample of entrants in unemployment that we used in the external validation reported in Subsection
6.3, assuming that the notification arrives as of entry (t0 = 0) and that the first interview is scheduled
after 22 months. We then simulate the ATT under two major sets of alternative policy reforms in
which we alter some design features of the monitoring scheme. In these simulations, we maintain
the assumption that benefit recipients are informed about the reform as of entry into unemployment.
In the first set of reforms, we keep the monitoring technology unaffected, but change the scheduled
timing of the monitoring interviews and study the effect of introducing a temporary sanction in case
of a negative evaluation at the first assessment. In the second set of reforms, we consider the same
reforms as in the first set, but increase the precision of the monitoring technology by allowing the
probability of a negative evaluation pi0k,u[.] at all meetings to depend on the average search effort
since the previous meeting, i.e. we allow βk > 0. A brief subsection puts our results in international
perspective by comparing them to those obtained from other structural models estimated on U.S. and
Dutch data. In a final subsection, we discuss an interesting property, which we label “front-loading” of
search effort. We demonstrate that when the monitoring technology is sufficiently sensitive to search
effort (i.e. βk sufficiently large), the latter may even exceed the post permanent sanction level.
7.1 The Effect of the 2004 Reform
In Panel A of Table 6, we report the effects of introducing the monitoring scheme on the long-term
unemployed workers notified by surprise in their 14th month of unemployment. We disentangle the
total effects into those for non-job seekers (u = +∞) and job seekers (u = v1).
Monitoring does not affect the unemployment duration of non-job seekers. The loss in UI payments
when there is a sanction reduces the expected discounted lifetime utility on average by 6,022 e . This
loss in UI payments is a direct transfer to the UI agency, which must, however, also finance the
operating costs possibly of multiple job search assessments. Net of financing operating costs, the
expected discounted gain is 5,871 e .
Among job seekers notified at t0 = 14, monitoring reduces the average unemployment duration
by about 6 days (0.18 months). Monitoring imposes a much lower utility loss on job seekers than on
non-job seekers: 184 vs 6,022 e . As already mentioned in Subsection 6.4, this is because monitoring
occurs very late in the unemployment spell and most notified workers, even without modifying their
search behavior, have already left unemployment before the second interview takes place and the first
sanction is potentially imposed. The additional working time more than compensates for the negative
28Based on accounting information from the UI agency, each assessment costs 100 e on average.
29See footnote 16.
30Since our framework assumes rational expectations, an individual is “treated” from the moment she is informed
about the monitoring process, because she can anticipate the monitoring as from that moment, i.e. at notification when
the program was introduced, but once the scheme was fully operational, at the start of unemployment.
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effect on wages, i.e. -2 e /month (not reported in Table 6). Hence, lifetime earnings increase by 325
e . The government’s discounted expenditures decrease by 368 e .
Overall, the program reduces the duration of unemployment by about 3 days, and although lifetime
earnings increase by 176 e , the expected loss in lifetime utility for the unemployed (2,787 e ) is of
the same order of magnitude as the government’s savings (2,817 e ). Thus, the net social gain of the
implemented reform is positive, but only marginally so.
Figure 5: The Partial Effects of Alternative Policy Design Features: The Benchmark Monitoring
Technology
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7.2 Policy Reforms without Affecting the Monitoring Technology
The negligible impact on unemployment duration and post-unemployment earnings reported in the
previous subsection were obtained because (i) the current monitoring scheme cannot have a behavioral
impact on the notified non-job seekers, (ii) the timing of the monitoring is very much spread out over
the unemployment spell, and (iii) sanctions are imposed very late. In this subsection, we investigate
whether changing the design of the monitoring scheme would lead to more positive conclusions. We
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measure the average impact on the whole population since caseworkers do not have access to a costless
technology allowing them to distinguish job seekers from non-job seekers. Before dealing with reforms,
first we consider the effects of the scheme that was implemented in 2004 as a benchmark, but instead
of assuming that the unemployed were notified by surprise about the monitoring after 14 months (as in
Panel A of Table 6), henceforth we consider a fully operational scheme in which workers have already
been informed about all the features from the start of the unemployment spell. This benchmark is
reported in Panel B.1 of Table 6. Compared to Panel A, the effect on unemployment duration is
slightly lower, but the net social gain is somewhat higher.
Next, we study the impact of gradually changing the design features of the monitoring scheme,
namely: (a) reducing the scheduled duration from entry in unemployment to the first interview from
22 months to 1 month; (b) reducing the scheduled timing of the second interview from 4 months to 1
month; (c) doing the same for the third assessment; and (d) increasing the sanction intensity at the
first interview from 0% to 100% of the temporary sanction imposed in the benchmark scheme at the
second interview. To this purpose, we first evaluate the partial effects of each of these four design
features separately. These effects are displayed in Figure 5. Subsequently, for each design feature, we
choose the value that reduces unemployment duration the most over the range of values considered in
Figure 5. In lines (a) to (d) of Panel B.2 in Table 6, we report the ATT of these values one by one. In
a third step, we combine design features (a)-(d) and impose them simultaneously. The corresponding
outcomes are reported in line (e).
Figure 5 illustrates that a stricter monitoring scheme along any of the dimensions (a), (b) and
(d) always reduces unemployment duration and lifetime utility, and increases lifetime earnings and
government savings. However, a stricter scheme also always entails a higher loss in lifetime utility.
Shortening the duration between the second and third meetings, i.e. (c), has the opposite effect on
all indicators. Why is this? Being negatively evaluated at the second meeting involves a temporary
sanction. From the third meeting onwards, the benefit level can only increase: in case of a negative
assessment, the benefit level does not change, while otherwise the higher benefit level, bh, is paid out
indefinitely. Hence, after the third meeting, the incentive to search falls. As shortening the duration
between the second and third interviews shifts the moment from which incentives are reduced forward
in time, the monitoring becomes more lenient rather than stricter. Hence, unemployment duration
is not minimized when the duration between the last two meetings is set to its current value (four
months), but we impose the status quo in Table 6.
With the three scheduled intervals set respectively at 1, 1 and 4 months and with the full sanction
bh−bl imposed already at the first meeting (line (e)), the ATT on the various indicators differ notably
from those in the benchmark (Panel B.1): the decline in average duration is almost three times higher,
the impact on lifetime earnings (50% higher) and public savings (30% higher) is much more favorable,
yet at the cost of larger losses in lifetime utility (40% higher). Whether introducing a more precise
monitoring technology (i.e. βˆk 6= 0 for all meetings k) can reduce government expenditures even more
without substantially harming lifetime utility is the object of the next subsection.
7.3 Policy Reforms in Case of Enhanced Monitoring Precision
The precision of the monitoring technology crucially depends on the sensitivity of the probability
of a negative evaluation to average search effort. In this subsection, we study what happens if we
increase the precision of this monitoring technology, without making it perfect, however. In order
to focus on the effect of enhancing the precision and not on increasing the level, we first set the
probability of a negative evaluation of job seekers with a zero effort level at the first meeting to that
of non-job seekers, i.e. α1,v1 = α1,∞ = 0.85 and the probability of a negative evaluation is, hence,
43%. Second, for those who search, we raise β1 to a strictly positive level such that the probability
of a negative evaluation at the first meeting remains at its value in Table 4, namely 21%, assuming
that average search effort remains unchanged as well. This corresponds to setting β1 = 0.82. At the
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second (resp., third) meeting, βk is also adjusted and is equal to κk · 0.82 for k = 2 (resp., 3).31 We
assume throughout that enhancing the precision of the monitoring technology is costless. This might
not be so unrealistic in the Belgian context though, since presumably precision could simply be much
improved by decreasing the discretionary power of the counselors in charge of the assessments and
replacing it with some strict uniform guidelines.
In Panel C of Table 6, we report how this enhanced precision in the monitoring technology affects
the ATT by proceeding in the same way as in Subsection 7.2. To start with, let us compare the
results of Panel C.1 to the corresponding ones in Panel B.1. The enhanced precision decreases average
unemployment duration by 44% (from -0.09 to -0.13 months). At the same time, lifetime utility falls
by only 4 e (less than 0.5% of the loss in Panel B.1) and lifetime earnings rise by 32 e (15% of the
gain in Panel B.1), while 63 additional euros are saved on public outlays (about 5% of the savings in
Panel B.1). The net social gain is 80% larger than in Panel B.1. Given the share of the unemployed
whose behavior is unaffected, this points to a non-negligible reduction in public spending without
inflicting too much utility loss (assuming risk neutrality). Observe that this is very different from
introducing more “strictness”, i.e. contrasting each line, apart from line (c), in Panel B.2 to the
benchmark in Panel B.1 (cf. Subsection 7.2). The latter always generates a utility loss of the same
order of magnitude or higher than the savings in government expenditures. This contrasting finding
partly reflects our assumption that enhancing precision comes at no cost. We have argued that this
is not unrealistic for Belgium, but more research on this dimension, in particular for other countries,
is required to evaluate whether this justifies reforms of monitoring schemes along these lines.
Next, we can see again that, also with enhanced precision, a stricter monitoring scheme along any
of the dimensions (a), (b) and (d) always reduces unemployment duration and lifetime utility, and
increases lifetime earnings and the savings made by the government.32 The combination of features
(a) to (d) in line (e) of Panel C.2 leads to an ATT on unemployment duration of half a month.
This is twice as large as the effect without enhanced precision (Panel B.2.(e)). Furthermore, a strict
monitoring scheme (Panel C.2.(e)) increases government savings more than losses in lifetime utility,
which was not the case when the monitoring technology was blunt (Panel B.2.(e)): the net social gain
increases from zero to 167 e . This confirms that the precision of the monitoring technology is key.
7.4 International Comparison
When comparing these overall findings to those of two other studies that evaluate job search
monitoring on the basis of a similar approach, the impact on unemployment duration is much smaller
in our paper. Paserman (2008) reports that monitoring in the U.S. decreases unemployment duration
by 4.7 weeks (6.3 weeks) assuming a (Log-) Normal wage offer distribution.33 In the Dutch case, van
den Berg and van der Klaauw (2015) report that compared to the counterfactual of no monitoring,
unemployment duration decreases by 3.6 weeks.34 In both papers, the impact is much greater than
that of the monitoring scheme introduced in Belgium: if fully operational, it would reduce expected
unemployment duration on average only by 0.09 months, i.e. 0.4 weeks. Part of the explanation is that
the monitoring in Belgium starts late in the unemployment spell and, furthermore, is much spread
out over time. The findings in Panel B. 2 line (e) reveal that imposing a much “stricter” monitoring
scheme that would be more in line with the U.S. and Dutch schemes makes up part of the difference:
average unemployment duration can then be expected to fall by 1.1 weeks. Increasing the monitoring
precision further reduces the gap. With such enhanced monitoring precision, the strict monitoring
regime shortens the unemployment spell by 2.3 weeks (Panel C.2 line (e)).
31See note b of Table 4 for more information.
32Qualitatively, the pattern is similar to the one displayed in Figure 5. The corresponding figure can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
33Paserman (2008) focuses his analysis on the unemployed with hyperbolic time preferences, but also considers those
with time consistent preferences. We restrict our comparison to the latter case presented in his Table 5.
34We deduce this from their Table 5.
28
We did not check whether by further increasing the precision of the monitoring, the impact would
be comparable to what is achieved abroad, but we doubt it for the two following reasons. First,
the institutional context of UI is very different in Belgium than in the two aforementioned countries.
Through the eligibility based on educational qualification, individuals with little or no work experience
can also be entitled to UI, job search requirements are only imposed late in the unemployment spell
(affecting the composition at entry) and UI benefits are not exhausted after a particular duration.
Consequently, Belgian UI caseloads will include individuals who in most other countries would only
be eligible for social assistance. Our estimation finding that job search costs are extremely high for
about 20% of UI entrants is in line with this hypothesis. For instance, if we assumed that this group of
non-searchers did not claim UI, monitoring would decrease unemployment duration by nearly 3 weeks
instead of the aforementioned 2.3 weeks (Panel C.2 line (e)). This further closes the gap with the two
other countries, but we have to keep in mind that this probably still underestimates the impact of the
different institutional design of UI, because the composition of job seekers is most likely also affected
by this design as well.
A second reason for the difference is that our evaluation was limited to a population of 25- to 30-
year-olds, while the two other studies did not restrict their analysis to a particular age class. Active
labor market policies are generally found to be less effective for the youth (Card et al., 2015, e.g.).
7.5 “Front-Loading” of Search Effort
In this subsection, we illustrate that if β1 is sufficiently high, the monitoring of search effort could
induce “front-loading” of search effort. If the opportunity to avoid a sanction is enhanced by raising
search effort, one may raise job search effort before the meeting even above the level attained after a
permanent sanction. This can be shown to be quite a general property. In their Proposition 2, Cockx
et al. (2011) provide a sufficient condition for search effort to increase above the post-sanction level.
The value that is chosen in Subsection 7.3 satisfies this condition.
In Figure 4, the dashed lines illustrate that front-loading indeed occurs if we set the parameters of
the probability of a negative evaluation to the values that generate the enhanced monitoring precision
discussed in Subsection 7.3. Search effort prior to the third meeting is higher than after the permanent
sanction is imposed. Moreover, the figure clearly illustrates that more precision leads to raising search
effort and reducing the reservation wage well before the actual meetings.
8 Conclusion
This paper sets up a structural job search model that formalizes key elements of monitoring job
search intensity in insured unemployment (UI). We innovate relative to the existing literature by
explicitly taking into account the fact that the measurement of search effort is imperfect and that the
assessments of search effort take place at prescribed moments in time, so that the unemployed can
anticipate them and gradually adjust their behavior nearer to these interviews, i.e. by allowing for
non-stationary behavior.
This model is estimated with administrative data collected around the introduction of a scheme
designed to monitor the search effort of young, long-term unemployed individuals in Belgium. The
estimation results point to a very weak behavioral impact of the monitoring scheme. According to
these results, once the scheme was fully operational, a population of 25- to 30-year-old entrants into
unemployment is expected to find a job on average 3 days earlier than in the absence of monitoring.
This effect is much lower than the impact of the order of 3 to 6 weeks found in the U.S. and the
Netherlands (Paserman, 2008; van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2015). Essentially this is because
(i) the timing of the monitoring is very much spread out over time, with the first assessment of search
effort (out of three at most) does not occur earlier than the 22nd month of UI; (ii) the monitoring
technology is not sufficiently precise; (iii) in contrast to the other studies, the evaluation is targeted
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at the youth, for whom active labor market policies are generally found to be less effective than for
prime aged workers; and (iv) UI in Belgium is also more lenient than in many other countries in other
respects, which makes UI caseloads more comparable to social assistance claimants and less responsive
to incentives. For instance, in Belgium, based on their educational qualifications, individuals with little
or no work experience are entitled to benefits and no time limit is imposed on eligibility. Our finding
that as much as 20% of UI entrants are estimated to have such high search costs that they cannot be
induced to search for a job supports this interpretation and underlines the fact that the effectiveness
of a job search monitoring scheme depends on the overall institutional design of UI.
The advantage of estimating this structural model is that it allows us to study how modifying the
design changes the impact of the monitoring scheme. We therefore simulated the effects of changing
some features of the monitoring scheme on a range of outcomes. These simulations show that reinforc-
ing the strictness of the monitoring, i.e. placing the meetings much earlier in the spell and introducing
the threat of sanctions at the first meeting, already has sizable implications: the duration of benefit
receipt is reduced by nearly a factor three, i.e. to 8 instead of 3 days. Since we found that the Belgian
monitoring scheme was very blunt in that the probability of a negative assessment was insensitive to
marginal changes in job search effort, we also investigated the implications of enhancing the precision
of the monitoring technology. From this analysis, we have concluded that introducing more precision
not only increases the effectiveness of monitoring in that it enhances job finding (e.g. the effect of the
aforementioned reinforcement of strictness further reduces unemployment duration by a factor two,
i.e. to 16 days), but also in that it generally increases savings in public expenditures more than it
reduces the lifetime utility of the unemployed. The latter may, however, partly reflect our assumption
that enhancing precision is costless. We argued this to be realistic for the Belgian scheme, but this
may not be the case elsewhere. Anyhow, this suggests that the precision of the monitoring technology
is key.35 Currently, we know very little about this precision and we therefore invite scholars to include
this in their research agenda.36
Finally, as any study, this research is not exempt from limitations. Let us list here a couple of
these without claiming to be exhaustive. A first weakness of this study is that we were not able
to distinguish between the job arrival rate and the job search effort. One way to solve this is to
collect information on indicators of job search effort (such as indicators of the types of search channels
used or the number of application letters sent), as van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2015) do.
Second, since we lacked complete information on non-labor income, we had to assume risk-neutral
agents. Introducing risk aversion into the analysis is crucial not only to study the impact of job
search monitoring on the optimal trade-off between insurance and work incentives, but also to better
understand how monitoring should be designed to minimize the distortions that the pursuit of these
conflicting objectives generate. Third, Lalive et al. (2015) have shown that UI reforms can have market
externalities. Thus, the impact of large monitoring schemes would be better studied in an equilibrium
search model, such as the one proposed by Boone et al. (2007). All these exiting topics are left as
avenues for further research.
Acknowledgements
This research has been financed by Belgian Science Policy through its programs Socie´te´ et Avenir
(contract AP/04) and Interuniversity Poles of Attraction. Andrey Launov gratefully acknowledges
35This was also the conclusion of Cockx et al. (2014), who studied the theoretical welfare implications of job search
monitoring of the unemployed with time inconsistent preferences.
36Recently, Arni and Schiprowski (2015) found that setting job search requirements above the job seeker’s unconstrained
effort choice can enhance the job finding rate substantially. These authors study the Swiss system in which job search
requirements are quite sharply defined. This supports our finding that a sufficiently accurate monitoring scheme can
indeed be effective in raising job search effort. However, more research is required to obtain insights into the sensitivity
of this effectiveness with respect to measurement precision and the implications on the design of job search monitoring.
30
financial support from the German Science Foundation under grant LA2389/2-1 and the research
hospitality of the Center for Economic Studies (Munich). We thank the Belgian Unemployment
Agency (ONEM) and the Banque Carrefour de Se´curite´ Sociale for their cooperation. We also thank
participants for their comments at workshops in Aarhus, Bonn (IZA), Ghent, Mainz, Nu¨rnberg (IAB)
and Paris (CREST), at conferences (the ESEM, the EALE, the Annual meetings of the SED and
of the SaM Network), at seminars at the Universita` Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, the University of
Cyprus, the University of Essex, the Ifo Institute, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of
Mannheim, the BI Norwegian Business School, the Paris School of Economics, the Universite´ Paris II,
the Universite´ de Strasbourg and the University of Tu¨bingen. We thank in particular Marc Gurgand,
Philipp Kircher, Franc¸ois Langot, and Klaus Wa¨lde for their useful comments and discussions.
References
Abbring, Jaap H., Gerard J. van den Berg, and Jan C. van Ours. 2005. The Effect of Unemployment
Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment. The Economic
Journal, 115, no. 505: 602–630.
Andrews, Donald W.K. 1988a. Chi-square diagnostic tests for econometric models: Introduction and
applications. Journal of Econometrics, 37, no. 1: 135–156.
Andrews, Donald W.K. 1988b. Chi-square diagnostic tests for econometric models: Theory. Econo-
metrica, 56, no. 6: 1419–1453.
Arni, Patrick, Rafael Lalive, and Jan C. van Ours. 2013. How Effective Are Unemployment Benefit
Sanctions? Looking Beyong Unemployment Exit. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 28: 1153–1178.
Arni, Patrick, and Amelie Schiprowski. 2015. The effects of Binding and Non-Binding Job Search
Requirements. IZA Discussion Paper 8951, IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn.
Ashenfelter, Orley, David Ashmore, and Olivier Descheˆnes. 2005. Do Unemployment Insurance Re-
cipients Actively Seek Work? Evidence from Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States. Journal of
Econometrics, 125, no. 1-2: 53–75.
van den Berg, Gerard J., Hanno Fo¨rster, Barbara Hoffman, and Arne Uhlendorff. 2015. Job search,
sanctions, and sickness absence. Unpublished manuscript, University of Mannheim, Mannheim.
Bloemen, Hans G. 2005. Job Search, Search Intensity, and Labor Market Transitions an Empirical
Analysis. The Journal of Human Resources, 40, no. 1: 231–269.
Bolhaar, Jonneke, Nadine Ketel, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2016. Job-Search Periods for Welfare
Applicants: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper 9786, IZA - Institute
of Labor Economics, Bonn.
Boone, Jan, Peter Fredriksson, Bertil Holmlund, and Jan C. van Ours. 2007. Optimal Unemployment
Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions. The Economic Journal, 117, no. 518: 399–421.
Boone, Jan, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Jan C. van Ours. 2009. Experiments on Unemployment Benefit
Sanctions and Job Search Behavior. European Economic Review, 53, no. 8: 937–951.
Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. 2015. What Works? A Meta-Analysis of Recent
Active Labor Market Program Evaluations. IZA Discussion Paper 9236, IZA - Institute of Labor
Economics, Bonn.
31
Christensen, Bent Jesper, and Nicholas M. Kiefer. 1994. Measurement Error in the Prototypal Job
Search Model. Journal of Labor Economics, 12, no. 4: 618–639.
Cockx, Bart, and Muriel Dejemeppe. 2012. Monitoring Job Search Effort. An Evaluation Based on a
Regression Discontinuity Design. Labour Economics, 19, no. 5: 729–737.
Cockx, Bart, Muriel Dejemeppe, Andrey Launov, and Bruno Van der Linden. 2011. Monitoring,
sanctions and front-loading of job-search in a non-stationary model. IZA Discussion Paper 6181,
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn.
Cockx, Bart, Corinna Ghirelli, and Bruno Van der Linden. 2014. Is it socially efficient to impose
job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?. Journal of
Public Economics, 113: 80–95.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and M. Daniele Paserman. 2005. Job Search and Impatience. Journal of Labor
Economics, 23, no. 3: 527–588.
Dolton, Peter, and Donal O’Neill. 1996. Unemployment Duration and the Restart Effect: Some Ex-
perimental Evidence. The Economic Journal, 106, no. 435: 387–400.
Dolton, Peter, and Donal O’Neill. 2002. The Long-Run Effects of Unemployment Monitoring and
Work-Search Programs: Experimental Evidence from the United Kingdom. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 20, no. 2: 381–403.
Eckstein, Zvi, and Gerard J. van den Berg. 2007. Empirical Labor Search: A Survey. Journal of
Econometrics, 136, no. 2: 531–564.
Eriksson, Stefan, and Niels Gottfries. 2005. Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search and persistent
unemployment. Labour Economics, 12: 407–428.
Eriksson, Stefan, and Jonas Lagerstro¨m. 2006. Competition between Employed and Unemployed Job
Applicants; Swedish Evidence. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108, no. 3: 373–396.
Flinn, Christopher J., and James J. Heckman. 1982. New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models
of Labor Market Dynamics. Journal of Econometrics, 18, no. 1: 115–168.
Fouge`re, Denis, Jacqueline Pradel, and Muriel Roger. 2009. Does the Public Employment Service
Affect Search Effort and Outcomes?. European Economic Review, 53, no. 7: 846–869.
Frijters, Paul, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2006. Job Search with Nonparticipation. The Economic
Journal, 116, no. 508: 45–83.
Garcia-Perez, J. Ignacio. 2006. Job Separation in a Non-Stationary Search Model: A Structural Es-
timation to Evaluate Alternative Unemployment Insurance Systems. Journal of Applied Economet-
rics, 21, no. 2: 245–272.
Gorter, Cees, and Guyonne R. J. Kalb. 1996. Estimating the Effect of Counseling and Monitoring the
Unemployed Using a Job Search Model. Journal of Human Resources, 31, no. 3: 590–610.
Keane, Michael P., Petra E. Todd, and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2011. The Structural Estimation of Be-
havioral Models: Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Methods and Applications. In Handbook
of Labor Economics. eds. by Orley Ashenfelter, and David Card, IV.A. Elsevier, , O. Ashenfelter
and D. Card edition: 331–461.
van der Klaauw, Bas, and Aico P. van Vuuren. 2010. Job Search and Academic Achievement. European
Economic Review, 54, no. 2: 298–320.
32
Klepinger, Daniel H., Terry R. Johnson, and Jutta M. Joesch. 2002. Effects of Unemployment In-
surance Work Search Requirements: The Maryland Experiment. Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 56, no. 1: 3–22.
Klepinger, Daniel H., Terry R. Johnson, Jutta M. Joesch, and Jacob M. Benus. 1997. Evaluation of
the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstration. Seattle and Bethesda. Batelle
Memorial Instiute and Abt Associates Inc..
Lalive, Rafael, Camille Landais, and Josef Zweimu¨ller. 2015. Market Externalities of Large Unemploy-
ment Insurance Extension Programs. American Economic Review, 105, no. 12: 3564–3596.
Lalive, Rafael, Jan C. van Ours, and Josef Zweimu¨ller. 2005. The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the
Duration of Unemployment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, no. 6: 1386–1417.
Launov, Andrey, and Klaus Wa¨lde. 2013. Estimating Incentive and Welfare Effects of Non-Stationary
Unemployment Benefits. International Economic Review, 54, no. 4: 1159–1198.
Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent. 1995. The Swedish Unemployment Experience. European
Economic Review, 39, no. 5: 1043–1070.
Lollivier, Stefan, and Laurence Rioux. 2010. An Empirical Examination of the Sources of Changes over
Time in the Job Finding Rate Using Reservation Wages and Rejected Wage Offers. International
Economic Review, 51, no. 4: 1039–1069.
Longhi, Simonetta. 2015. Do the Unemployed Accept Jobs Too Quickly? A Comparison with Employed
Job Seekers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9112, Bonn: IZA.
Manning, Alan. 2009. You Can’t Always Get What You Want: The Impact of the UK Jobseeker’s
Allowance. Labour Economics, 16, no. 3: 239–250.
McVicar, Duncan. 2008. Job Search Monitoring Intensity, Unemployment Exit and Job Entry: Quasi-
experimental Evidence from the UK. Labour Economics, 15, no. 6: 1451–1468.
Meyer, Bruce D. 1995. Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments. Journal of
Economic Literature, 33, no. 1: 91–131.
Mortensen, Dale T. 1986. Job Search and Labor Market Analysis. In Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. II. eds. by O. Ashenfelter, and R. Layard, Amsterdam. North-Holland, : 849–919.
Mroz, Thomas A. 1987. The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women’s Hours of Work
to Economic and Statistical Assumptions. Econometrica, 55, no. 4: 765–799.
OECD. 2007. Employment Outlook. Paris. OECD, :207-242.
Paserman, M. Daniele. 2008. Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation and
Policy Evaluation. The Economic Journal, 118, no. 531: 1418–1452.
Pavoni, Nicola, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2007. Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 74, no. 1: 283–318.
Petrongolo, Barbara. 2009. The Long-Term Effects of Job Search Requirements: Evidence from the
UK JSA Reform. Journal of Public Economics, 93, no. 11-12: 1234–1253.
Ridder, Geert. 1984. The Distribution of Single-Spell Duration Data. In Studies in Labor Market
Dynamics. eds. by G.R. Neumann, and N.C. Westerg˚ard, Darmstadt. Springer-Verlag, , Chap. 3:
45–73.
33
Ridder, Geert, and Gerard J. van den Berg. 2003. Measuring Labor Market Frictions: A Cross-Country
Comparison. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, no. 1: 224–244.
Setty, Ofer. 2015. Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring. April, Unpublished manuscript,
Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv.
Tanner, Martin A., and Wing Hung Wong. 1983. The estimation of the hazard function from randomly
censored data by the kernel method. Annals of Statistics, 11, no. 3: 989–993.
Tanner, Martin A., and Wing Hung Wong. 1984. Data-based nonparametric estimation of the hazard
function with applications to model diagnostics and exploratory analysis. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 79, no. 385: 174–182.
Todd, Petra E., and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 2006. Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in
Mexico: Using a Social Experiment to Validate a Dynamic Behavioral Model of Child Schooling
and Fertility. American Economic Review, 96, no. 5: 1384–1417.
van den Berg, Gerard J. 1990. Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory. Review of Economic Studies,
57, no. 2: 255–277.
van den Berg, Gerard J., and Bas van der Klaauw. 2006. Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed
Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment. International Economic Re-
view, 47, no. 3: 895–936.
van den Berg, Gerard J., and Bas van der Klaauw. 2015. Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job
Search Monitoring. IFAU Discussion Paper No. 2015:16, Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market
and Education Policy, Uppsala, Sweden.
Wolpin, Kenneth I. 1987. Estimating a Structural Job Search Model: The Transition from School to
Work. Econometrica, 55, no. 4: 801–818.
Wunsch, Conny. 2013. Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, no. 3: 1030–1045.
34
